Lt. Gen. David Petraeus walks through a Bagdad market as part of his. “hearts and mind” outreach in March 2007 (US Army)
by Todd DePastino
On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush spoke to the nation from the White House to announce a plan to deploy an additional 20,000 US troops to Iraq. The Iraq War, launched with “shock and awe” in March 2003, had devolved into a bitter sectarian civil war combined with an anti-American insurgency. Conservative estimates had put the Iraqi civilian death toll at over 100,000. Sunni and Shia factions had battled on the streets, filling the vacuum left by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. American troops, caught in the middle, faced mounting casualties. The violence and chaos made forming a new stable Iraq impossible.
President Bush put his hopes for “The Surge” in Lt. Gen. David Petraeus’s counterinsurgency doctrine. Petraeus, former commander of the 101st Airborne Division, was a strong proponent of the judicious use of force. Money, too, he argued, was a weapon. So were infrastructure and jobs. Wars, in other words, aren’t won by force alone, but by winning hearts and minds and following through on promises to improve people’s daily lives. Without such improvement, US forces in Iraq would be seen as hostile occupiers. With it, the most anti-American insurgents would be isolated and easier to defeat.
Bush named Petraeus his new commander of Coalition Forces and gave him broad authority to implement his plan.
US troops in Iraq were given tour extensions, and the new troops who joined them clustered in urban areas like Baghdad to engage with local communities, including some which had fought against the US occupation. At the same time, US forces launched targeted strikes against insurgent strongholds, including the so-called “al-Qaeda in Iraq.” American officials bribed, cajoled, and otherwise convinced Sunni tribal leaders to join the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq. These counterinsurgency Sunnis became known as the Sunni Awakening. In places like Anbar Province, the Sunni Awakening quelled violence and took back ground from al-Qaeda. In Shia areas, the Mahdi Army led by Muqtada al-Sadr called a ceasefire against their Sunni and US enemies.
By mid-2008, the security situation in Iraq had improved significantly. Violence levels dropped, and civilian casualties declined. Baghdad, once a hotspot for sectarian strife, saw relative stability. The number of attacks on U.S. forces also decreased. The Surge of troops had stabilized the country, giving Iraqis breathing space to forge new social, political, and economic institutions. Those in the US Congress who had opposed The Surge were forced to admit that Bush’s gambit had largely succeeded.
Subsequent history, however, has called this success into question. Iraq remains one of the unhappiest and least stable places on earth. It has terrible infrastructure, widespread poverty, millions of refugees, anti-government violence, and a national sovereignty compromised by Iran-backed militias. And these problems don’t even take into account the years between 2013-2018, when the Islamic State controlled as much as a quarter of the country.
There can be no doubt that the situation in Iraq improved after The Surge, at least temporarily. Debate will continue over how much the increased security and stability came from the expansion of the US military presence in Iraq and how much from the Sunni Awakening and Shia moderation. Also, don’t forget the billions of dollars the US poured into Iraq to restore basic services, rebuild war-torn communities, and employ civilians who might otherwise have joined the insurgency.
The 19th century Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously quipped that “war is politics by other means.” That would seem as true in the 21st century as it was in Napoleon’s day.
